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International Governance through Soft Law: 
The Case of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
ABSTRACT 
Soft law plays an important role in the regulation of international tax matters. This pa-
per focuses on the case of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and analyses the rela-
tionship between this non-binding instrument and the formal sources of law. From the 
perspective of international law, the OECD Guidelines are mainly connected to double 
tax treaties, but they may also influence customary norms and the general principles of 
law. From the point of view of domestic legal systems, references to the OECD Guide-
lines can be found in the tax legislation of some countries and, especially, in the inter-
pretative circulars of the Tax Administrations. Furthermore, in some states the courts 
have also taken the OECD Guidelines into account in their judgements, which shows 
that they are almost treated as hard law. However, this practical relevance of the Guide-
lines does not seem to be in accordance with the process in which they were made in the 
OECD, which could be more open to the different stakeholders and more transparent. 
 
Keywords: soft law, transfer pricing, international taxation, OECD, international gov-
ernance, recommendations, guidelines. 
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International Governance through Soft Law: 
The Case of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
1. INTRODUCTION1 
Soft law plays an important role in the international governance of many issues. For 
instance, the literature has highlighted the relevance of soft law for the international 
protection of the environment (Dupuy 1991) and the regulation of the global financial 
system (Brummer 2011). However, despite some exceptions (Vogel 2005; Christians 
2007), the study of the role of soft law in the area of international taxation has not re-
ceived the attention that it deserves according to the influence that non-binding instru-
ments have in this field. In this sense, it should be noted that most of the work of the 
OECD on international taxation takes place through soft law, such as the model conven-
tion for the prevention of double taxation, its corresponding commentaries, the transfer 
pricing guidelines and the standards for effective exchange of information on tax mat-
ters. Even though international taxation is usually seen as a rather technical field, the 
distribution of tax revenues among states remains a political issue which, as Rixen 
(2008a) has noted, should attract the interest not only of tax experts but also of political 
scientists. Moreover, this area exemplifies many aspects of the connection between hard 
and soft law which have been studied by international law scholars such as Baxter 
(1980), Boyle (1999) and Schreuer (1977). 
The main aim of this paper is to examine the relation between soft law and the for-
mal sources of law, focusing on the particular case of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. These Guidelines are not legally binding, but given the nature of the transfer 
pricing problem, they have become a focal point and are very influential not only from 
the perspective of international law, but also directly on the national legal systems of 
many countries. Moreover, the way these Guidelines were drafted in the context of the 
                                                 
1  Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), Department of Law. E-mail: alberto.vega@upf.edu. A preliminary ver-
sion of this paper was presented at the conference “Politics beyond the State: Transformations of the State be-
tween De- and Repoliticization”, organized by the Collaborative Research Center 597 “Transformations of the 
State”, University of Bremen (27 to 29 May 2010). I am grateful to the participants of the conference and two 
anonymous referees for their perceptive comments. Financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and 
Competitiveness and the European Social Fund is acknowledged (grant BES-2008-003252). This work was par-
tially prepared during a research visit to the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance (Munich) and 
is part of the activities of the Research Group on Tax Law (2009-SGR-886), financed by the Government of 
Catalonia. 
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OECD will also be analysed to see if it is in accordance with the practical relevance that 
they exert. 
In order to study the previous aspects, the paper is organized according to the follow-
ing structure. To begin with, the main characteristics of the transfer pricing problem are 
introduced. After that, the notion of soft law is presented and the example of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines is analysed, paying particular attention to their historical 
evolution and elaboration process. Next, the influence that these Guidelines have had on 
the formal sources of law is studied, both from the perspective of international law and 
the domestic legal systems of several countries.  
2. THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM AND ITS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
The transfer pricing problem is not only about taxation, but it is one of its most impor-
tant dimensions. As is well known, multinational enterprises play a major role in to-
day’s economy. These multinationals are made up of different units located around the 
world which trade with each other. Since these subunits are not independent, but a part 
of the whole multinational, one of the problems that arises is that of determining the 
price that has to be charged for the goods and services that are exchanged among those 
units.  
Multinational enterprises may take different aspects into account when deciding 
these prices. For instance, they may want to minimize the exchange risks associated 
with the different currencies with which they operate. They may also use transfer pric-
ing as a way of overcoming the restrictions on cash transfers (such as profit repatria-
tions) that some countries impose, or to help foreign subsidiaries to compete during the 
initial years after being set up (Abdallah 1989, 14-22). 
However, the most important factor that is usually taken into account is taxation, in-
cluding not only income taxes but also tariffs. If a country charges high import duties, a 
multinational will have an incentive to charge low transfer prices to its subsidiaries in 
that country to reduce the value of imports and the corresponding tariffs. Similarly, dif-
ferences in corporate tax rates may be very important and thus, multinationals may fix 
transfer prices so that most profits are allocated in the jurisdictions with lower tax rates. 
The importance of this factor has been clearly shown by the economic literature on this 
topic. For instance, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003, 2246) present evidence that transfer 
pricing is used to shift profits in response to differences in corporate tax rates and ac-
cording to their estimations this influence is very important. In particular, at the margin 
more than 65% of the additional revenue resulting from a unilateral tax increase is lost 
because of income shifting. Thus, what could be seen as an “opportunity” for multina-
tional companies is a serious problem for the tax revenues of the states. 
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With respect to the solutions to the transfer pricing problem, it is possible to distin-
guish two main alternatives. One possibility is to follow the arm’s length principle, 
which is the option recommended by the OECD. According to this principle, the prices 
charged between related parties should be equivalent to those that would have been 
charged between independent parties in the same circumstances. However, in many 
cases the application of this principle will be difficult since it may not be possible to 
find a comparable market transaction. Indeed, as Coase (1937, 390) pointed out, “the 
main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem that there is a cost of 
using the price mechanism”. Consequently, if the existence of firms is justified by the 
purpose of avoiding the transaction costs of market exchanges, establishing a compara-
ble market price will be impossible in many cases.  
Another alternative which has received the support of some scholars is unitary taxa-
tion, also known as formulary apportionment. If this system is followed, the first step 
would be to calculate the worldwide profit of the multinational enterprise. After that, the 
taxable income would be distributed among the different countries where it operates 
according to a given formula that would take several aspects into account, such as the 
sales or the number of employees that correspond to each jurisdiction. This system has 
some advantages. For instance, if we accept that in the case of multinationals it is not 
possible to determine one “true” source of income, then the purpose of income alloca-
tion should be to distribute the corresponding taxes among the states with a legitimate 
claim to them in the most equitable way. This seems easier if a formula that reflects a 
conception of equity is used (Hellerstein 2005, 108). Moreover, from a practical point 
of view, it seems that formulary apportionment would be easier to administer and less 
resources would have to be invested in documenting all transactions and in litigation 
(Avi-Yonah and Clausing 2007, 14-16).  
However, the implementation of formulary apportionment has some associated diffi-
culties. For example, it may not be easy to reach a consensus on the definition of the 
taxable base or on the weight of the apportionment factors of the formula (Hellerstein 
2005, 110). As Cockfield (2004, 122-123) pointed out, formulary taxation “is unaccept-
able on tax sovereignty grounds principally because it would bind participants to formu-
las and tax rules set at the supranational level”. Moreover, in comparison to the arm’s 
length standard, formulary apportionment may be too inflexible. In other words, the 
ways of applying the arm’s length principle have continuously evolved to take into ac-
count changing economic circumstances and business practices (Neighbour and Owens 
2002, 956). Therefore, its adoption, especially by the OECD, seems very unlikely.2 
                                                 
2  Consequently, Avi-Yonah (2009), who is in favour of formulary apportionment, has suggested the possibility of 
using this method at least in the context of the arm’s length standard to allocate the residual profit in the profit 
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Summing up, both the arm’s length principle and formulary apportionment have ad-
vantages and disadvantages and therefore it is difficult to say if one alternative is in 
general better than the other. However, once the countries agree on the convenience of 
avoiding tax evasion through transfer pricing, all parties are better off if they follow the 
same strategy, independently of the one which is chosen. The classical example of such 
a strategic interaction is choosing which side of the road to drive on, as what really mat-
ters is that all drivers choose the same side of the road, no matter which. Therefore, in-
teractions in transfer pricing should not be modelled as a prisoner’s dilemma but rather, 
as a coordination game (Radaelli 1998, 18). Despite this, the initial situation in which 
the countries have to decide whether to cooperate or not may be seen as a prisoner’s 
dilemma with distributional conflict, especially if we take into account that small coun-
tries may prefer not to cooperate and become tax havens (Dehejia and Genschel 1999, 
411).3 
Focusing on those countries which agree to cooperate, the transfer pricing problem 
can be modelled as a coordination game in which the consequences of the different al-
ternatives are not the same for all. For instance, formulary apportionment could be es-
pecially attractive for developing countries, since these states usually lack the necessary 
administrative resources to enforce the complex regulations implementing the arm’s 
length principle. As Mutén (1992, 7) points out, “transfer pricing is a difficult subject 
for any tax administration, and in developing countries, the tax administrations rarely 
find themselves able to give the matter the attention needed to counter the findings of 
more resourceful administrations in industrial countries”. Moreover, many developing 
countries may fear that measures trying to enhance the enforcement of tax provisions 
could be seen as a hostile act which could have a negative impact on the attraction of 
foreign direct investment (Lall 1993, 218). Further, another particular difficulty for the 
application of the arm’s length standard in developing countries is that usually there is 
not enough case-law which could guide taxpayers, especially considering their political 
instability and their weak rule of law (Baistrocchi 2006, 954). As a result, it is not sur-
prising that Casanegra de Jantscher and Mansfield (1993, 38) find that the arm’s length 
principle has proved difficult to apply in Latin America. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the interest of developing countries for the formu-
lary apportionment solution will depend on the particular factors of the formula. In this 
sense, several authors even consider that the most common criteria which could be 
                                                                                                                                               
split method. 
3  In fact, many of the countries which currently do not regulate transfer pricing issues, such as Andorra, Anguilla 
and the Cayman Islands (KPMG 2011, 27-28), have traditionally been perceived as tax havens. This aspect has 
also been observed by Borkowski (1997, 332) and Calderón (2007, 5). 
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taken into account would be especially beneficial for developed countries. For instance, 
if tax revenues are distributed according to the value of the capital assets that a multina-
tional enterprise has in each state, industrialized countries would receive most of the 
income since their plants usually have more expensive equipment (Mutén 1992, 7; 
Casanegra de Jantscher and Mansfield 1993, 38).4 
Therefore, if we accept that a certain system could be more beneficial for a certain 
group of countries (although all of them would prefer to follow the same strategy rather 
than different ones) the transfer pricing problem could be modelled, as Radaelli ex-
plains, as a “battle of the sexes game”, that is, “in transfer pricing actors want to use a 
common standard, although they cannot agree on the standard to be employed” 
(Radaelli 1998, 5-6). Furthermore, the different ways in which these alternatives can be 
implemented can also favour, to a greater or lesser extent, certain kinds of countries. In 
the coming sections we will see that facing such a type of strategic game has important 
implications on the influence that soft law may exert on the behaviour of states.  
3. THE OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES:  
AN EXAMPLE OF GOVERNANCE THROUGH SOFT LAW 
This section presents the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as an example of soft law. 
To begin with, the concept of soft law, which is frequently controversial, will be intro-
duced, as well as some of the main advantages and disadvantages which are normally 
associated with the use of non-binding instruments. The last parts of this section will 
focus on the way the OECD works in relation to tax matters and on the characteristics 
of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as soft law. 
3.1. The notion of soft law 
The use of soft law instruments is becoming increasingly common in the context of 
global governance or, in other words, with respect to those matters that require a regula-
tion that goes beyond the limits of a certain state. This can also be observed with respect 
to tax matters. As Ring (2010, 4) notes: “Despite the formal, hard law power of the state 
over tax policy, international organisations influence the actual design of international 
tax policy and tax rules in a variety of ways, up to and including the creation or exercise 
of “soft law” power”.  
The notion of soft law is frequently used in this context but not always with the same 
meaning. Basically, it is possible to distinguish three main approaches. The most com-
                                                 
4  However, Horner (2001) considers that the sales element in the formula could favour developing countries. 
Therefore, this author criticizes the fact that this method never had a chance at the OECD.  
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mon, which is the one that this paper will follow, identifies soft law with legally non-
binding instruments which, nonetheless, are created with the intention of having an im-
pact on the behaviour of states. Alternatively, the expression “soft law” may be used to 
refer to those instruments, even if legally binding, which are excessively vague or im-
precise, or to those which lack formal enforcement mechanisms. 
The first conception focuses on the non-binding character of soft law, by contrast to 
the classical sources of international law, which are summed up in Art. 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ): international conventions, interna-
tional customary norms and the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions.5 In general, the previous list of sources is considered to be complete or exhaus-
tive, but in the opinion of authors such as Schreuer (1977, 112), Art. 38(1) cannot limit 
the freedom of states to create international law by other means. Indeed, some even con-
sider that new sources of law may have already arisen and thus, Art. 38(1) would be 
outdated.6  
With respect to the recommendations provided by international organisations, which 
play an important role in the field of international taxation, their legal status will depend 
on the constituent treaty of each institution. However, in some cases, as Klabbers (2002, 
197) points out, the constituent treaties may not be clear on the types and nature of the 
acts to be adopted and sometimes new instruments, which may be difficult to fit into the 
existing categories, are introduced. 
Given the fact that not all the recommendations that are issued by international or-
ganisations have exactly the same characteristics, the definitions that have been proposed 
are relatively wide. For instance, Virally (1956, 94) defines them as an invitation to be-
have in a certain way, but without specifying the legal consequences that they may have. 
The reason is that the previous author considers that defining them as non-binding in-
struments would be insufficient, since they can produce many different effects depending 
on the specific regulation of each international organisation.7 In particular, with respect 
to the recommendations aimed at member states, although formally they do not impose 
any legal obligation, in the view of Virally they may have legal consequences depending 
on the powers which have been delegated to the international organisation.8 
                                                 
5  For an analysis of the classical sources of law, see Kennedy (1987). 
6  For a review of these arguments, see Danilenko (1993). 
7  In the words of Virally, “Le véritable problème ne se réduit pas à une simple alternative entre l’existence et 
l’absence d’une force obligatoire: c’est celui, plus vaste et plus difficile, de la signification juridique de 
l’invitation portée par la recommandation, des effets de droit qu’elle peut produire, à défaut même d’obligation 
directement et immédiatement créée” (Virally 1956, 69). 
8  According to the opinion of this author, “Il est donc incontestable que l’exécution ou le refus d’exécution d’une 
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In relation to this approach, one important question is whether a legal obligation can 
be graduated or not. In other words, is it possible to consider that some agreements are 
more legally binding than others? This is a controversial aspect. Some authors consider 
that the idea of legal obligation can be seen as a continuum, ranging from the weakest 
form (the parties expressly declare that an agreement is not binding) to the strongest (a 
treaty is clearly binding) (Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter and Snidal 2000, 404; 
Chinkin 1989, 865). In between, there may be instruments framed as “recommenda-
tions” or “guidelines” which are generally considered to be non-binding even though 
this is not explicitly stated. Similarly, in the opinion of Baxter (1980, 564) it would be 
“excessively simplistic to divide norms into those that are binding and those that are 
not”, since even those which are not binding could have certain legal effects. Moreover, 
Goldmann (2008, 1877) finds that a relative concept of law allows a more precise as-
sessment of the legal effects of a given instrument. In this sense, Duplessis (2007, 268) 
considers that as a result of a mechanical application of the binary code legal/illegal, 
international law may become disconnected from the real world and unable to guide the 
behaviour of international actors. 
Conversely, other scholars believe that the distinction between binding and non-
binding agreements is a binary one, which means that it is only possible to distinguish 
between norms and non-norms, but not between more or less binding norms. In the 
opinion of Weil (1983, 416), the variable normativity of international law should be 
seen as a pathological phenomenon. Similarly, Klabbers (1996, 182) concludes that the 
notion of soft law is redundant, since it is enough with the distinction between those 
agreements which are law and those which are not law at all.  
Despite these controversies, what is clear, as we will see later in more detail, is that 
the recommendation of the OECD on the Transfer Pricing Guidelines is not legally 
binding, even though it has been issued with the intention of influencing the global 
regulation of this matter. 
3.2. Advantages and risks of soft law 
The use of non-binding agreements has been strongly criticized by several scholars, but 
there are also reasons that may justify their creation. Before dealing with the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines in detail, this section will briefly present the main advan-
tages and disadvantages of soft law.  
With respect to the advantages, it is clear that soft law helps to reach agreements that 
otherwise would not be possible. In the opinion of Dean and Kelly (2009, 601), it facili-
                                                                                                                                               
recommandation n’est pas juridiquement indifférent. L’une et l’autre attitudes sont, au contraire, susceptibles de 
produire des effets de droit” (Virally 1956, 87). 
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tates the coexistence of different legal cultures, perspectives and values, laying the basis 
for cooperation among states. Moreover, it is more flexible than binding agreements, 
which enables the introduction of amendments. Thus, it would be possible to verify if 
the proposed agreement is useful and, if it works correctly, it could be the first step to-
wards a binding treaty.  
In addition, the costs related to soft law agreements are generally lower than those 
arising from the negotiation of binding instruments. The reason is that the consequences 
of violating them are usually not so severe and, therefore, states will not invest so many 
resources in the negotiation process (Abbott and Snidal 2000, 434). Similarly, the 
amount of time required to agree on a soft law instrument may be relatively smaller, due 
to the fact that the approval process is much simpler. Conversely, the ratification of 
binding instruments, which may require the intervention of national parliaments, de-
pending on the constitutional regulations of each state, can produce important delays. 
Furthermore, non-binding agreements are less costly to states in terms of sovereignty 
than hard law (Abbott and Snidal 2000, 436). This is especially clear if hard law entails 
delegating authority to an international organisation, since states would lose the capac-
ity to regulate certain issue areas independently. Therefore, in the view of Guzman 
(2005, 61), in certain cases the use of non-binding agreements could be optimal, so 
there is no a priori reason why they should be viewed as a less desirable form of coop-
eration. 
With respect to the disadvantages, some authors have pointed out that soft law is a 
danger to the rule of law (Klabbers 1998, 391). The reason is that soft law may be cre-
ated through mechanisms which do not fulfil all the requirements for the creation of 
hard law (such as transparency, public debate and democratic legitimacy) but, in spite of 
that, it may end up “hardening”, as will be shown later in more detail. As a result, Rose 
and Page (2001) consider that soft law could be seen as legislation through the back 
door, with the corresponding deficiencies in terms of public scrutiny and accountability. 
However, in the case of law created through the regular legislative procedures (“front 
door”, in the terminology of Rose and Page), both supporters and opponents can scruti-
nize the proposed legislation and express their arguments for and against.  
3.3. The OECD and the creation of soft law in tax matters 
The OECD is an international organisation with the capacity to provide binding norms 
(referred to as decisions in Art. 5(a) of the OECD Convention) to its member states. 
However, in practice the OECD produces almost only soft law, especially with respect 
to tax matters. According to the OECD database which contains all decisions, recom-
mendations and other instruments in force, it can be observed that, in relation to taxa-
tion, at present there are 17 recommendations and one declaration (all of them non-
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binding) but only one convention with a protocol (binding) in force.9 Thus, the work of 
the OECD in this field consists more in diffusing principles and policy solutions, which 
is known as governance through soft law (Rixen 2008a, 116; Marcussen 2004), rather 
than in establishing precise and binding regulations which would limit the sovereignty 
of the member states. 
With respect to the (soft) law-making process on tax matters in the context of the 
OECD, the following aspects can be highlighted. To begin with, tax issues are dealt 
with by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA), which is made up of senior officials of 
the different OECD member governments as well as by observers of some non-
members, such as Argentina, China, India, Russia and South Africa. Moreover, the CFA 
also consults with representatives from the business community, especially through the 
Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC). As a result, Chris-
tians (2010, 21) sees the CFA as a public/private network, but in the view of Rixen 
(2008b, 6) access by civil society interests is too limited and therefore the CFA can be 
better described as a transgovernmental expertocracy. 
Further, the CFA receives the support from the Centre for Tax Policy and Admini-
stration (CTPA), which is a Directorate within the Secretariat and prepares technical 
work. Consequently, the staff of the CTPA are directly employed by the OECD accord-
ing to their technical expertise, forming what Christians (2010, 18-19) calls an expert 
network of tax professionals. In this sense, Ring (2010, 30) considers that the profes-
sional staff of the OECD provide an example of the kind of organisational leadership 
that is independent of the states themselves. 
Finally, the recommendations are taken by the Council, which comprises a represen-
tative of each member state, by mutual agreement of all members. However, if a coun-
try abstains from voting on a recommendation, it will be applicable to the countries 
which voted in favour but not to the abstaining ones. As Ault (2009, 763) stressed, the 
consensus principle is central and given that negotiators meet up periodically, a country 
may sacrifice its position in a particular case in order to have more support for a future 
issue of greater importance.  
However, the way the OECD works has also several limitations. To begin with, 
membership to the OECD is limited to developed countries and, despite the recent ef-
forts to foster cooperation with non-member states and with other international organi-
sations, their influence in the OECD is still very limited. Moreover, Christians (2010, 
33-34) considers that the law-making process of the OECD is excessively opaque and 
that the use of soft governance methods has generated uncertainty about the legal status 
of certain instruments. This could be due, for instance, to the fact that the OECD lacks 
                                                 
9  See the database of acts of the OECD (http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/Default.aspx). 
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an official journal (Vogel 2005, 147). In this sense, Calderón (2007, 27) stressed the 
fact that the (soft) law-making process in the context of the OECD lacks the transpar-
ency, possibilities of public discussion and democratic control that would correspond to 
the activity of the national legislature. As Ramallo (2005, 16-17) has pointed out with 
respect to transfer pricing, an international organisation with limited legitimacy, the 
OECD, is replacing national parliaments. 
3.4. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as soft law 
In relation to the historical evolution of the international regulation of transfer pricing, 
the first model tax treaties prepared by the League of Nations already referred to the 
arm’s length standard.10 Later, the same principle was also introduced in Art. 9 of the 
1963 OECD Draft Convention and, subsequently, in the current OECD Model Conven-
tion and in most tax treaties in force. However, the arm’s length standard is very broad 
and before the introduction of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the lack of ad-
ministrative guidance in most countries was an obstacle for its application (Linde, 1977, 
82). 
The United States was the first country which dealt with this issue in detail and in 
1968 the Department of the Treasury prepared precise regulations for certain types of 
inter-company transactions. As several authors have noted (see, for example, Avi-
Yonah 2007; Eden et al. 2001; Langbein 1986; Picciotto 1992) the United States started 
an international campaign to promote international cooperation in this area and exerted 
a great influence in the discussions in the OECD during the seventies. Finally, the 
OECD issued in 1979 the report “Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises”, 
which reaffirmed the adoption of the arm’s length principle and detailed the methods 
that were acceptable for determining transfer prices from the point of view of taxation. 
This report was included in a recommendation of the OECD Council of Ministers to the 
Governments of the Member Countries but, despite being adopted without reservations, 
it was not legally binding.  
Some years before, in 1976, the OECD had already provided the more general 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which covered several issues such as em-
ployment and industrial relations, competition, financing and which also made a brief 
reference to taxation. In particular, it was stated that enterprises should refrain from 
making use of the particular facilities available to them, such as transfer pricing which 
does not conform to the arm’s length standard, for modifying in ways contrary to na-
                                                 
10  See, for instance, Art. 5 of the 1933 League of Nations draft Convention Adopted for the Allocation of Business 
Income between States for the Purposes of Taxation and Art. VI of the Protocol to the Mexico Draft of 1943 and 
the London Draft of 1946.  
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tional laws the tax base on which members of the group are assessed. These Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises were included as an appendix to the Declaration by the 
Governments of OECD Member countries of 21 June 1976 in which they jointly rec-
ommend to multinational enterprises their observance. Therefore, as Vogelaar (1980, 
127-136) explains, the voluntary nature of the guidelines was never questioned as no 
government or body of the Organisation proposed legally binding rules. However, the 
previous author considers that these Guidelines have a political and social value and 
“are not devoid of legal significance” since their adoption by the governments of the 
most influential countries of the world accords them a legal authority (Vogelaar 1980, 
135). 
Over the next few years, the OECD continued the work in this field and published 
different reports focusing on particular aspects of transfer pricing, such as the mutual 
agreement procedure, transfer pricing in the banking sector and the allocation of central 
costs. It is also important to note that in 1992 a significant reform of the transfer pricing 
regulation was introduced in the United States, allowing profit methods and, conse-
quently, going beyond the traditional approach.11  
In 1995, the OECD published the new Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Although the ba-
sic principles remained the same, a reform was necessary to take into account techno-
logical developments as well as the differences which had arisen between the United 
States and other OECD countries. They have been later supplemented by several reports 
(for instance, on intangible property and services and on advance pricing agreements) 
and certain amendments have also been introduced in a continuous process of revision.12 
In their current version (OECD 2010) they are structured in seven chapters. The first 
one is the most important since it states the arm’s length principle and provides guid-
ance for its application, and the next two chapters present in detail the methods for 
computing transfer prices. The following chapters deal with administrative issues, such 
as the mechanisms for resolving transfer pricing disputes and documentation require-
ments. Finally, certain problematic aspects, such as issues related to intellectual prop-
erty rights, are also dealt with in more detail. 
With regard to the legal status of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, they were 
approved by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 27 June 1995 and are the object of the 
Recommendation of the OECD Council C(95)126/FINAL, of 13 July 1995. This rec-
ommendation is not legally binding since it is based on Art. 5(b) of the Convention on 
                                                 
11  For a detailed analysis of the evolution of transfer pricing regulations, see Rixen (2008a, 126-130). 
12  As Rixen (2008a, 190-191) explains, innovations take the form of incremental changes, subsuming the reforms in 
the traditional concepts which are generally accepted. The reason is that reaching a general agreement on a com-
plete reform would be difficult and could lead to coordination deficiencies. 
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the OECD and therefore, the tax administrations of the OECD member states are simply 
encouraged to follow the Guidelines. However, authors such as Calderón (2007, 11) 
consider that a sort of “soft obligation” derives from the recommendations of the 
OECD, which means that “States must follow them, unless they have introduced re-
serves to these or when material reasons exist that prevent it (like singularities of the 
domestic law of such states)”. In fact, the current version of Recommendation C(95) 
126/FINAL (whose last amendment took place through Recommendation C(2010)99, of 
22 July 2010), instructs the Committee on Fiscal Affairs to monitor the implementation 
of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which shows that member states are clearly expected 
to comply with them. Moreover, the Committee is also instructed to encourage non-
member states to follow the Guidelines. 
4. FROM SOFT TO HARD LAW:  
THE INFLUENCE OF THE OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES 
Soft law may end up “hardening” in many different ways. In the next sections this pos-
sibility is illustrated with the example of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, both 
from an international and a domestic point of view. However, before analysing the par-
ticular mechanisms through which this influence takes place, it is important to note that, 
in general, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines serve as a focal point and are fol-
lowed even without relying on sanctions.  
As McAdams (2000) explains, in the case of coordination games, the law provides a 
focal point around which individuals can coordinate their behaviour. In such a situation, 
the mere expectation that others will play the strategy associated with the focal point 
ends up being self-fulfilling. Moreover, McAdams (2000, 1672) considers that this ex-
pressive effect of law (an idea which can also be applied to soft law) is not only relevant 
with respect to pure coordination games but also in relation to games in which the play-
ers have some common interest as well as some conflicting interests. The result is that 
the international organisations which deal with coordination problems can exert a big 
influence even if their standards are not legally binding, precisely because of the self-
enforcing nature of coordination equilibria (Abbott and Snidal 1998, 16). As Rixen 
(2008a, 20) explains, non-binding soft law may be enough to provide a solution for a 
distributive conflict in a coordination game. Therefore, even though the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines are not legally binding, they work as a focal point given their public-
ity and the reputation of the OECD.13  
                                                 
13  Apart from the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, model tax treaties also work as a focal point. Although they 
are an example of soft law, they are enough for reaching an international consensus because the double tax prob-
lem can also be modelled as a coordination game. For more details, see Rixen (2008a, 169-172). 
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Next, when commenting the relation between soft law and international law it will be 
possible to appreciate that the influence of soft law on state practice has, in turn, an im-
portant impact on the formation of customary norms of international law and general 
principles of law. 
4.1. The influence of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines on the 
formal sources of international law 
The following paragraphs will briefly discuss the influence that soft law can have on the 
formal sources of international public law (treaties, customary norms and the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations), focusing on the particular case of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. As Schachter (1991, 301) pointed out, “the conclu-
sion that non-binding agreements are not governed by international law does not how-
ever remove them entirely from having legal implications”.  
To begin with, soft law may influence treaties in several ways. For instance, it may 
be a first step towards a binding agreement, which is particularly common in the field of 
human rights (Schachter 1991, 85). However, soft law works most frequently in a com-
plementary way, especially as an interpretative tool of the treaties in force. With respect 
to the relevance of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for the interpretation of tax 
treaties, the following aspects should be noted.  
First, in some cases the signatory states to a treaty may explicitly indicate in diplo-
matic notes or in a protocol to the treaty that it should be interpreted according to the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. In this sense, references to the Guidelines have been in-
cluded, for instance, in the protocols to the treaties between Belgium and the United 
States (2006), Bulgaria and the United States (2007), and Iceland and the United States 
(2007). Moreover, in the case of the treaty between Japan and the United States of 2003, 
both countries agreed through diplomatic notes that the treaty should be interpreted ac-
cording to the latest available version of the Guidelines, which is criticized by several 
authors for allowing an informal modification of the original meaning of the treaty 
(Calderón 2007, 14 and 19; Vogel 2005, 147). Furthermore, the recent treaty between 
Japan and the Netherlands of 2010, which is not yet in force, allows, in certain cases, to 
submit the differences arising from its application to arbitration and the complementary 
agreement which develops this possibility expressly states that issues related to the ap-
plication of the arm’s length standard should be decided having regard to the Guide-
lines, as amended from time to time. Thus, the previous examples show that through 
these references, the Guidelines almost become a part of the treaties in force. 
Second, even in the absence of specific references in the treaties or their protocols, 
the Transfer Pricing Guidelines are closely related to the Commentaries to the OECD 
and United Nations Model Tax Conventions, which identify the Guidelines with the 
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internationally agreed principles for the application of the arm’s length standard con-
tained in the Models and, consequently, in almost all treaties in force. As a result, the 
Guidelines can be seen as a part of the Commentaries (Vettel 1996, 19; Calderón 2007, 
11-13; Bullen 2011, 20-30). This has been particularly clear since 1992, when a new 
paragraph to the Commentaries to Art. 9 of the OECD Model Convention was intro-
duced stating that the OECD Guidelines were valid for the application of the arm’s 
length principle. Consequently, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines can be seen as a 
part of the Commentary to the OECD Model Convention and this gives them an impor-
tant relevance when interpreting the tax treaties in force which are based on the OECD 
Model. In fact, the Group of Experts of the United Nations has also recommended fol-
lowing the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines regarding the application of the arm’s 
length principle established in Art. 9 of the UN Model Convention, clearly expanding 
the influence of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines beyond the OECD member 
states (Calderón 2007, 14). 
In this sense, even though the Commentaries to the OECD Model are not legally 
binding, Engelen (2008) considers that the OECD states which voted in favour of them 
may be obliged to follow them by virtue of the doctrines of estoppel and acquiescence. 
However, most authors, such as Ward (2008) and Pijl (2008), do not share this view, 
but, nonetheless, it is clear that even without the legal obligation to follow the Commen-
taries, in practice they are taken into account when interpreting the treaties in force.  
Apart from treaties, soft law may influence international customary norms, which are 
constituted by two fundamental elements: state practice and the conviction that they 
reflect or amount to law (opinio juris). In this regard, Hillgenberg (1999, 514) considers 
that non-binding agreements cannot directly produce customary international law, but 
they can contribute to its creation as an emerging opinio juris. Similarly, in the view of 
Bothe (1980, 87), documents which are not legally binding as such may be used as 
proof of customary law.  
In relation to the possibility that the use of the arm’s length standard may have be-
come a norm of customary international law, not all authors share the same opinion. In 
the view of Thomas (1996), this principle has become a general state practice and, 
moreover, the negative reaction of the international community to the application by 
some states of the United States of the formulary apportionment method to multination-
als shows that the arm’s length principle is generally seen as compulsory. Similarly, 
Avi-Yonah (2007) also sees this principle as a customary norm. However, even though 
the material requirement, that is, the presence of a general state practice, is widely ac-
cepted, the existence of opinio juris is most frequently denied. In general it is consid-
ered (see, for example, Lang 2004, 99) that no customary norm obliges states to elimi-
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nate double taxation and, therefore, as Lepard (1999) concludes, states are not obliged 
to use any particular method to prevent the double taxation of multinationals. 
Another formal source of international law are the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations (Art. 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ). Although this source 
is highly controversial and its practical relevance is rather meagre (van Hoof 1983), the 
arm’s length standard, as applied by the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, could qualify as 
one of these principles. On the one hand, if we follow the conception that these princi-
ples must be common to the domestic legal systems of a wide number of states (Søren-
sen 1946, 113) it is clear that the arm’s length principle satisfies this condition. On the 
other hand, if we admit (such as Verdross 1968, 525-526) that the general principles 
may have an international origin and may focus on certain issue areas (such as human 
rights, the protection of the environment or taxation), the arm’s length standard would 
also fit in this category. However, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a whole 
cannot be considered a general principle of law given their level of detail and the differ-
ent topics covered, but they are a basic tool for the application of the arm’s length prin-
ciple. 
4.2. The influence of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines on the 
domestic legal systems 
Apart from the influence of soft law on the formal sources of international law, the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines may also have an impact from the domestic perspec-
tive. In this sense, the following pages will focus on the connection between soft law 
and legislation, circulars of the tax administration and case-law.  
4.2.1. References in legislation 
Several countries, such as Ireland, Mexico, Spain and the United Kingdom refer to the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in their legislation, usually indicating that they 
should be taken into account for interpretative purposes. In Ireland, section 835D(2) of 
the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 states since 2010 in the following terms that the 
OECD Guidelines should be considered when computing transfer prices among related 
parties: 
“For the purpose of computing profits or gains or losses chargeable to tax under Case I or 
II of Schedule D, this Part shall be construed to ensure, as far as practicable, consistency 
between— 
(a) the effect which is to be given to section 835C, and 
(b) the effect which, in accordance with the transfer pricing guidelines, would be given if 
double taxation relief arrangements incorporating Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Tax 
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Convention applied to the computation of the profits or gains or losses, regardless of 
whether such double taxation relief arrangements actually apply, 
but this section shall not apply for the purposes of construing this Part to the extent that 
such application of the section would be contrary to the provisions of double taxation relief 
arrangements that apply to the computation of those profits or gains or losses.” 
Moreover, section 835D(1) indicates that the particular version of the Guidelines to be 
considered is the one of 2009, but section 835D(3) allows the Minister of Finance to 
update this reference if the OECD publishes new versions of the Guidelines.14 
In the case of Mexico, Art. 215 of the Income Tax Act15 establishes the arm’s length 
standard for the valuation of operations between related parties and explicitly states that 
this should be interpreted according to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines of 1995 
or to those which may substitute them as long as they are consistent with the Mexican 
legislation and the treaties signed by Mexico. In Spain, reference to the Guidelines is 
made in the preamble to Ley 36/2006,16 which establishes that Spanish legislation on 
transfer pricing must be interpreted in the light of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines (even though the content of preambles is not legally binding). 
In the case of the United Kingdom, the Taxation (International and Other Provi-
sions) Act 2010, in the version given by Finance Act 2011, indicates in Section 164(1) 
that when interpreting domestic legislation, preference should be given to the interpreta-
tion which prevents contradictions with the OECD Guidelines, which are defined as: 
“(a) the version of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations approved by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) on 22 July 2010, or  
(b) such other document approved and published by the OECD in place of that (or a later) 
version or in place of those Guidelines as is designated for the time being by order made by 
the Treasury, including, in either case, such material published by the OECD as part of (or 
by way of update or supplement to) the version or other document concerned as may be so 
designated” (Section 164(4)).  
In this sense, it is important to note that Section 58(2) of the Finance Act 2011 clearly 
states that the reference to the version of 2010 of the Guidelines has effect, for corpora-
                                                 
14  Section 835D(3) includes the following habilitation: “The Minister of Finance may, for the purposes of this Part, 
by order designate any additional guidance referred to in paragraph (a)(iii) of the definition of “transfer pricing 
guidelines” in subsection (1) as being comprised in the transfer pricing guidelines”. 
15  Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta (Official Journal of the Federation, 1 January 2002).  
16  Ley 36/2006, de 29 de noviembre, de medidas para la prevención del fraude fiscal (Official Journal of the State, 
30 November 2006). 
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tion tax purposes, for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 April 2011, and for 
income tax purposes, for the tax year 2011-12 and subsequent tax years. Previously, 
reference was made to the version of the Guidelines existing in 1998. In comparison to 
other countries, the British legislation is precise when indicating the version of the 
OECD Guidelines to be considered, which increases legal certainty in this area. 
Furthermore, other countries such as Hungary, Latvia, Norway, Peru and Romania 
have also included references to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in their transfer 
pricing legislation, usually indicating that they shall be taken into account for interpreta-
tion purposes (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012). This implied delegation of competences 
from the national Parliaments to the OECD seems problematic from the perspective of 
the principle of legality in tax matters (Calderón 2007, 22). Moreover, it is important to 
note that in those countries where the application of the arm’s length standard is not 
regulated in detail, the Guidelines may be used in practice to fill gaps of the legislation 
even though this would go beyond a simple interpretative assistance. 
4.2.2. References in administrative circulars 
Reference to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines is most frequently made in circu-
lars or other analogous documents issued by the Tax Administrations and which, in 
general, are only binding to them but not to taxpayers or the judiciary. However, most 
taxpayers will follow the views expressed in these circulars since otherwise they may 
risk audits and long litigation processes with the Tax Administrations. 
In Australia, the taxation rulings of the Tax Administration state the intention to fol-
low the Guidelines as close as possible17 and this attention can also be observed in Bel-
gium18 and Canada.19 Similarly, in Germany, some of the most relevant circulars of the 
Federal Ministry of Finance (Verwaltungsvorschriften) on issues related to transfer pric-
ing include constant references to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.20 
                                                 
17  Paragraph 1.5 of Taxation Ruling 98/11 states: “The ATO [Australian Taxation Office] will follow as closely as 
practicable the OECD publication 'Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administra-
tions', 1995, OECD ('the 1995 OECD Report')”. 
18  Some of the most relevant circulars in which this can be observed are the ones from 28 June 1999 (Circulaire n° 
AAF/98-0003 dd. 28.06.1999) and 14 November 2006 (Circulaire n° Ci.RH.421/580.456 (AFER 40/2006) dd. 
14.11.2006). 
19  One of the circulars of the Canada Revenue Agency where this is clearer is the Income Tax Information Circular 
87-2R, of 27 September 1999. 
20  See, Schreiben betr. Grundsätze für die Prüfung der Einkunftsabgrenzung zwischen nahestehenden Personen mit 
grenzüberschreitenden Geschäftsbeziehungen in Bezug auf Ermittlungs- und Mitwirkungspflichten, Berichtigun-
gen sowie auf Verständigungs- und EU-Schiedsverfahren (Verwaltungsgrundsätze-Verfahren), vom 12. April 
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The case of New Zealand is significant since its Tax Administration issued its own 
guidelines on transfer pricing to guide its taxpayers,21 but in a consistent way with the 
OECD Guidelines, that is, the tax authorities of New Zealand basically tried to present 
the OECD Guidelines in a more accessible way for their taxpayers. This practice was 
justified by the Tax Administration with the following arguments: 
“There is, however, no valid reason why Inland Revenue should not follow the OECD 
guidelines entirely in administering New Zealand’s transfer pricing rules. The consensus es-
tablished between OECD member countries means that the OECD guidelines will, for ex-
ample, be the relevant guidelines to consider if a transfer pricing issue is raised under New 
Zealand’s double tax agreements. […] Consequently, New Zealand’s guidelines should be 
read as supplementing the OECD guidelines, rather than superseding them. […] By issuing 
guidelines with a practical focus, Inland Revenue hopes to explain transfer pricing in a way 
that is perhaps more accessible to taxpayers confronted by the issue than are the OECD 
guidelines” (paragraphs 6, 7 and 8). 
Another country where administrative guidance for the application of transfer pricing 
legislation is particularly important is the United Kingdom. The British Tax Administra-
tion (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, HMRC) has published different types of 
non-binding instruments to guide taxpayers, such as Statements of Practice, Tax Bulle-
tins and Guidance Manuals which frequently refer to the Guidelines. For instance, 
Statement of Practice SP 2/10 on Advance Pricing Agreements states: 
“The centre-piece of the proposal will be a description of the method by which it is pro-
posed to determine the transfer pricing issues in accordance with the arm’s length principle, 
and an analysis demonstrating how the application of that method satisfies the terms of the 
UK’s legislation, including the effect of any DTA, and is consistent with the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines” (paragraph 3 of Annex 1). 
In the same sense, other publications of the British Tax Administration have also 
stressed the relevance of the Guidelines, such as the International Manual issued by 
HMRC, which states:22 
                                                                                                                                               
2005 and Schreiben betr. Grundsätze für die Prüfung der Einkunftsabgrenzung zwischen nahe stehenden Perso-
nen in Fällen von grenzüberschreitenden Funktionsverlagerungen (Verwaltungsgrundsätze Funktionsverlage-
rung), vom 13. Oktober 2010. However, despite the references to the OECD Guidelines, the German regulation of 
the taxation of Funktionsverlagerungen or „transfers of functions“ remains very particular. 
21  See, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines: A guide to the application of section GD 13 of New Zealand’s Income Tax 
Act 1994”, Tax Information Bulletin, vol. 12, no. 10 (Appendix), October 2000. 
22  This publication is available online: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/Index.htm.  
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“The Inland Revenue will be guided by the Guidelines in applying domestic transfer pricing 
legislation and in seeking to prevent double taxation under the terms of Double Taxation 
Conventions with OECD Member countries. The Inland Revenue encourages taxpayers to 
consult the Guidelines when evaluating whether their transfer pricing complies with the 
arm's length principle” (INTM463010). 
“The comments in this chapter are not intended to be a substitute for the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines. […] You should always refer to the Guidelines for further detail” 
(INTM463010). 
In the case of Switzerland, the tax authorities have issued several circulars indicating 
that they will follow the OECD Guidelines, such as the Circular of the Federal Tax 
Administration no. 4 of 19 March 2004, which points out the fact that that the Director 
of the Federal Tax Administration informed the cantonal administrations, by letter of 4 
March 1997, that they should take into account the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
when dealing with the taxation of multinational enterprises.23 
With respect to the influence of the OECD Guidelines in non-member States of the 
OECD, the South African Revenue Service published Practice Note no. 7, of 6 August 
1999, developing the legislation on transfer pricing and stating clearly that it is based on 
the OECD Guidelines: 
“Because of the international importance of the OECD Guidelines, this Practice Note is 
based on, inter alia, those guidelines. Although South Africa is not a member country of the 
OECD, the OECD Guidelines are acknowledged as an important, influential document that 
reflects unanimous agreement amongst the member countries, reached after an extensive 
process of consultation with industry and tax practitioners in many countries. The OECD 
Guidelines are also followed by many countries which are not OECD members and are 
therefore becoming a globally accepted standard” (paragraph 3.2.1). 
Moreover, the South African Tax Administration considers that taxpayers should follow 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines if they do not find specific guidance in the tax 
treaties entered into by South Africa, the legislation or the practice notes of the Admini-
stration (paragraph 3.2.3 of the cited Practice Note). 
In other non-OECD countries, such as Namibia, the Tax Administration has also is-
sued practice notes indicating the need to follow the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
In particular, Tax Practice Note 2/2006, issued by the Director of the Namibian Tax 
                                                 
23  The circular states: “La présente Circulaire […] rappelle que le Directeur de l’Administration fédérale des contri-
butions a, par lettre du 4 mars 1997, informé les administrations cantonales que lors de la taxation d’entreprises 
multinationales elles devaient tenir compte des Directives OCDE en matière de prix de transfert”. 
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Administration, even states that in case of conflict, the OECD Guidelines (in the latest 
available version) will prevail over the practice note.  
Another significant aspect is that in some countries such as Austria, the Czech Re-
public, Italy and the Slovak Republic, the OECD Guidelines have been translated and 
published by the tax authorities.24 In Austria, they were published in the Official Journal 
of the Austrian Tax Administration (Amtsblatt der Österreichischen Finanzverwaltung, 
AÖFV),25 but the Austrian doctrine (Vettel 1996, 14-17) does not consider them to have 
a binding nature for taxpayers, but only that of informative circulars from the Ministry 
of Finance (Erlässe). In Italy, the OECD Guidelines of 1995 were translated by the 
Ministry of Finance and were published in 1997 by the Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello 
Stato. 
Finally, in the United States, the existence of detailed regulations on transfer pricing 
has made circulars referring to the OECD Guidelines unnecessary. However, on certain 
occasions the Tax Administration has expressed its intention to follow the OECD, for 
instance in the framework of the mutual agreement procedure which is frequently used 
to solve transfer pricing cases involving the application of a tax treaty. In this sense, 
section 3.03 of the Procedures for Requesting Competent Authority Assistance Under 
Tax Treaties (Rev. Proc. 2006–54)26 states:  
“Applicable Standards in Allocation Cases. With respect to requests for competent au-
thority assistance involving the allocation of income and deductions between a U.S. tax-
payer and a related person, the U.S. competent authority and its counterpart in the treaty 
country will be bound by the arm’s length standard provided by the applicable provisions of 
the relevant treaty. The U.S. competent authority will also be guided by the arm’s length 
standard consistent with the regulations under section 482 of the Code and the Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations as published 
from time to time by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. When 
negotiating mutual agreements on the allocation of income and deductions, the U.S. compe-
tent authority will take into account all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case 
and the purpose of the treaty, which is to avoid double taxation”. 
To sum up, it is possible to observe that tax administrations rely heavily on the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines in order to interpret the legislation and even fill its gaps. In 
the opinion of Calderón (2007, 23-24), the circulars should refer to a particular version 
of the Guidelines to avoid the problem of “dynamic interpretation”, since that would 
                                                 
24  The OECD has also published translations of the Guidelines into non official languages of the organization, such 
as German and Spanish. 
25  See AÖFV 1996/114, AÖFV 1997/122 and AÖFV 2000/171. 
26  Internal Revenue Bulletin, no. 2006-49 (4 December 2006). 
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increase legal certainty. However, if new versions of the OECD Guidelines are pub-
lished and the tax administrations do not update their circulars, the situation could be-
come confusing. In fact, from the experience of the countries which were previously 
analysed, it could be appreciated that normally reference is made to the OECD Guide-
lines in general, without further details, or specifying that the latest available version 
should be considered. Although in most countries the interpretative circulars issued by 
the Tax Administration are not a formal source of domestic law, in practice they are 
seen as very relevant by taxpayers and even by the courts. This is probably one of the 
mechanisms which more clearly contributes to the transformation of the OECD Guide-
lines into almost hard law. 
4.2.3. References in case-law 
In the case-law of the main courts of certain countries it is possible to observe the atten-
tion paid by the judges to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. In general, this phe-
nomenon has been qualified by Rose and Page (2001, 19) as judicial “creep”, which 
“occurs when judges invoke soft laws, such as European Commission recommenda-
tions, to arrive at decisions that differ from what would be produced by applying hard 
laws”. When this happens, soft law becomes “hard pseudo law”: since it was not prom-
ulgated according to the regular process of legislative enactment it must be considered 
“pseudo law”, but as a result of being applied as if it were enacted normally, it has the 
same effects as hard law (Rose and Page 2001, 2). However, as we will see in this sub-
section, in the cases dealing with transfer pricing the courts rely on soft law mainly to 
interpret or complement hard law, especially when the OECD Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines regulate aspects which are not covered by domestic legislation. 
To begin with, in Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal in the case Smithkline 
Beecham Animal Health Inc. v. Canada, of 31 May 2002 ([2002] F.C.A. 229) justified 
the use of the OECD Guidelines as an interpretative tool with the following arguments: 
“It appears to be common ground that the OECD Guidelines inform or should inform the 
interpretation and application of subsection 69(2) of the Income Tax Act. The OECD Guide-
lines state the principles for determining international transfer prices and, where possible, 
the agreement among OECD members with respect to the practices to be followed” (para-
graph 8). 
In Germany, the Federal Fiscal Court (Bundesfinanzhof) took the OECD Guidelines into 
account and cited them to reinforce its position in its judgement of 17 October 2001 (I R 
103/00). Similarly, in Austria the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) also 
referred to the OECD Guidelines in its judgement of 13 September 2006 (reference no. 
2002/13/0190) to justify the method which was more adequate for the determination of 
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transfer prices among related firms. In Italy, the judgement of the Corte Suprema di 
Cassazione of 13 October 2006 (no. 22023) also considered the 1995 Guidelines to con-
firm the initial position of the Court, even though the facts of the case took place before 
their publication.  
Another country where the Courts have paid attention to the OECD Guidelines is 
Spain. For instance, the judgement of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) of 6 Feb-
ruary 2008 (RJ 2008/1357) considers that the position of the Tax Administration was in 
accordance not only with the domestic legislation but also with the 1979 OECD Report 
on Transfer Pricing. Similarly, the Audiencia Nacional also referred to the OECD 
Guidelines to justify the use of certain methods to compute transfer prices under the 
arm’s length standard, since they were more explicit than the Spanish legislation 
(judgements of 27 September 2007 (JUR 2007/306677) and 11 December 2008 (JUR 
2009/3142)). 
In Switzerland, the relevance of the Guidelines can be observed in the judgement of 
the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht / Tribunal administratif 
fédéral) of 24 September 2009 (A-710/2007). In it, the court cited the Circular of the 
Federal Tax Administration no. 4 of 19 March 2004, which highlights the relevance of 
the OECD Guidelines for the Tax Administration and, consequently, referred to the po-
sition of the OECD when considering the methods which were acceptable to compute 
transfer prices. 
Moreover, it is important to note that also the courts of non-OECD countries, such as 
Kenya, have taken the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines into account. In this sense, 
the High Court of Kenya established in the case Unilever Kenya Limited v. the Commis-
sioner of Income Tax27 that given the legal gaps existing in Kenya it would be necessary 
to follow the OECD Guidelines to solve the dispute. In particular, justice Visram used 
the following arguments: 
“Now, these guidelines do not form the laws of the countries in question. They are simply 
“guidelines”, guiding the world of business, that is business enterprises and the taxing au-
thorities of those countries in arriving at proper Transfer Pricing principles for the pur-
poses of computation of income tax. […] And especially because of the absence of any such 
guidelines in Kenya, we must look elsewhere. […] I have no doubt in my mind that […] the 
relevant guidelines such as “Transfer Pricing” principles […] are not just here for relaxed 
reading. These have been evolved in other jurisdictions after considerable debates and tak-
ing into account appropriate factors to arrive at results that are equitable to all parties. […] 
It would be fool-hardy for any court to disregard internationally accepted principles of 
                                                 
27  Judgement of 5 October 2005 (Income Tax Appeal no. 753 of 2003). 
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business as long as these do not conflict with our own law. To do otherwise would be highly 
short-sighted”.  
However, in a few other countries the courts have expressly rejected following the 
OECD Guidelines or they mention them only in very exceptional cases. In particular, in 
Australia the Federal Court stated in the judgement SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd v. Commis-
sioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 635, of 25 June 2010, that the OECD Guidelines were 
not legally binding and that it would deviate from them: 
“Both the 1979 and the 1995 guidelines have a role in assisting the Court in considering the 
appropriate methodology and the way in which methodologies are to be applied. I refer to 
the 1995 guidelines as a convenient reference to the various methods that have been 
adopted or referred to in determining arm’s length consideration. However, the 1995 guide-
lines do not dictate to the Court any one or more appropriate methods, and are just what 
they purport to be, guidelines. I treat them effectively as part of the submissions of Counsel 
as referring to a number of methods by which an arm’s length consideration might be calcu-
lated.  
I have not relied upon any of the guidelines for the purposes of interpreting Div 13” (para-
graphs 58 and 59). 
In other countries such as the United States and France, references to the OECD Guide-
lines in the case-law are almost non-existent. As an exception, it is possible to cite the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Noonan in the judgement of the United States Court of Ap-
peals, Ninth Circuit, of 27 May 2009 in the case Xilinx, Inc., and Consolidated Subsidi-
aries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (no. 09-74246, 06-74269), even though the 
mention does not add substantial arguments. Similarly, references to the OECD Guide-
lines in the French case-law are also rare. One exception is the judgement of the Cour 
de Cassation (Chambre Commerciale), of 17 March 2009 (no. 08-14503), although the 
case does not deal with taxation but with competition law. 
Despite the clear exception of the cited Australian judgement, in many cases it is 
possible to observe what Rose and Page (2001, 19-20) qualify as judicial “creep”, since 
the OECD Guidelines, which are soft law, end up affecting taxpayers. In the opinion of 
the previous authors, several measures should be introduced to avoid this phenomenon, 
such as reminding judges that mere recommendations should not be treated as law, and 
modifying the existing norms to avoid the ambiguities which tend to favour situations of 
judicial “creep”. In the case of transfer pricing, this means that national legislation 
should regulate, for instance, the methods which are considered to be admissible for the 
determination of arm’s length prices. Otherwise it seems logical to expect that the 
courts will have to rely on the more detailed content of the OECD Guidelines to “inter-
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pret” the arm’s length standard mentioned in the legislation or, actually, to fill legal 
gaps.  
4.2.4. Summary 
The next table summarizes the main empirical findings of this section devoted to the 
influence of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines on the domestic legal systems. 
Table 1.  Countries with references to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in their 
legislation, circulars of the Tax Administration and case-law. 
With references in  
legislation 
Hungary, Latvia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Romania, Spain 
and the United Kingdom.  
Frequent references 
Australia, Belgium, Canada,  
Germany, Namibia, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom. 
Translation and  
publication of the  
Guidelines by the  
Tax Authorities 
Austria, Czech Republic, Italy and 
Slovak Republic. 
With references in  
circulars and other  
publications of the  
Tax Administration 
References in  
particular cases United States. 
Countries  
with references  
to the OECD 
Guidelines 
With references in  
case-law 
Canada, Germany, Italy, Kenya, Spain and Switzerland. 
In very exceptional cases: United States and France. 
References denying the relevance of the Guidelines: Australia. 
 
In general, it is possible to appreciate that transfer pricing practices tend to converge in 
most countries around the OECD Guidelines. The connection between the Guidelines 
and the domestic legal systems takes place in different ways. In some cases, the legisla-
tion includes explicit references to the OECD Guidelines, usually stating that they 
should be taken into account when interpreting the domestic transfer pricing rules. 
However, references to the OECD Guidelines are most frequently contained in the cir-
culars of the Tax Administration, which in general are only binding for the Administra-
tion itself but not for taxpayers or the courts, even though, in practice, references to the 
OECD Guidelines in the case-law are not strange especially in those countries whose 
domestic legislation is more imprecise.  
This situation could be seen as an example of what Genschel and Zangl (2008) qual-
ify as denationalization of political authority through an international organisation, in 
this case the OECD. Despite the fact that the power of the OECD remains incomplete, 
since it requires the collaboration of the states to implement its recommendations, in 
practice it is very difficult for a single country to introduce an alternative regulation. As 
Calderón (2007, 20) notes, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, “without totally los-
ing their nature of soft law, have evolved, to a degree, into an instrument of hard law”. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 163) 
- 25 - 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper shows that in the case of transfer pricing, soft law can be as influential as 
hard law. In general, the transfer pricing problem can be seen as a coordination game, 
since once the countries agree on the need to regulate this issue to prevent tax evasion, a 
common regulation is always preferable, even though all the alternatives may not have 
the same distributive result. In this type of situation, soft law, such as the OECD Trans-
fer Pricing Guidelines, becomes a focal point and exerts a clear influence on the formal 
sources of law.  
From the perspective of international public law, the OECD Guidelines are fre-
quently used as a complement, especially for interpretative purposes, to the double tax 
treaties in force. In general, the OECD Guidelines are seen as an extension of the Com-
mentary published by the OECD on its Model tax convention. Moreover, in the particu-
lar case of certain tax treaties, the parties have even included explicit references to the 
OECD Guidelines in protocols (which are legally binding). Besides the influence on 
treaties, some authors have claimed that the arm’s length standard, which is developed 
by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, may have become a customary norm of in-
ternational law, even though for most legal scholars the requirements of customary 
norms are not completely met. However, the arm’s length standard seems to qualify as a 
general principle of law recognized by civilized nations, which is one of the formal 
sources of law mentioned by Art. 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
From the point of view of domestic legal systems, the legislation of several countries 
includes references to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, usually indicating the 
need to take them into account when interpreting the national norms. Moreover, the Tax 
Administrations refer very frequently to the OECD Guidelines in the circulars in which 
they present their interpretation of the national legislation. Although these circulars are 
generally not binding to taxpayers or the judiciary, in practice most taxpayers will fol-
low them to avoid litigation with the Tax Administration. In fact, in many countries it is 
also possible to observe judicial decisions which take the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines into account, especially when they regulate a certain aspect with more detail 
than the domestic legislation. 
The relevant influence of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which in practice 
become a “source” of law, contrasts with the limitations of the process in which they 
were made within the context of the OECD. In particular, the participation of develop-
ing countries, which may have different interests in relation to transfer pricing issues, is 
limited since they are not OECD member states. Moreover, although the elaboration of 
tax rules could be seen as a rather technical activity for experts, in fact they are a central 
aspect of the political debate and, therefore, the transparency and public debate sur-
rounding the work of the OECD on tax matters should be improved following the ex-
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ample of national legislatures. In this sense, a limitation of the current situation is the 
fact that the OECD does not have an official journal and most of its publications, such 
as the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, are not freely accessible to taxpayers. 
However, the fact that soft law instruments may have some deficiencies does not 
necessarily mean that they should be replaced by traditional hard law, such as a multi-
lateral treaty or a binding decision taken by the OECD. Since these limitations do not 
depend on the non-binding nature of the agreement but on the way the agreement is 
reached and made public, it would be enough with a reform of the law-making process 
in the OECD. Nevertheless, proposing concrete changes to the way the OECD works is 
a complex subject which should be the object of further research.  
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